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I. JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This court has jurisdiction of this appeal from a final order 
granting summary judgment pursuant to Rule 3, subdivision (a) , Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure and Utah Code Annotated section 78-2a-
3(2)(k) (1987). 
II. STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The primary issue is whether the trial court erred in ruling 
as a matter of law that the plaintiff, Jose Ruiz, was not employed 
in commerce at the time of his injury and was, therefore, not 
entitled to the benefits of the Federal Employers' Liability Act 
(FELA). 
On appeal from summary judgment, an appellate court resolves 
only legal issues. It determines whether the trial court erred in 
applying governing law and whether the trial court correctly held 
that no genuine issue of fact was in dispute. Weese v. Davis 
County Comm'n, 834 P.2d 1 (Utah. 1992). When reviewing an order 
granting summary judgment, the evidence and all inferences that may 
be reasonably drawn from the evidence must be literally construed 
in favor of the party opposing the motion. Johnson v. Morton 
Thiokol, Inc., 818 P.2d 997 (Utah 1991). 
When reviewing an order concerning the rights and obligations 
of parties in a Federal Employers' Liability Act case, the court is 
bound by federal law interpreting the statute. Chesapeake & Ohio 
Rv. Co. v. Kuhn. 284 U.S. 44, 46-47, 76 L.Ed. 157, 160, 52 S.Ct. 45 
(1931). 
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The issues concerning employment and coverage by the statute 
were raised by appellant in his Memorandum in Opposition to 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (R. at 243) , his Memorandum 
of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for 
Summary Judgment (R. at 235) and his Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities in Reply to Defendant's Opposition to Plaintiff's 
Motion for Summary Judgment (R. at 395). 
III. DETERMINATIVE STATUTE 
The applicable statute, codified as 45 U.S.C. section 51, is 
reproduced verbatim in the addendum. In relevant part, with 
emphasis added, it provides that: 
Every common carrier by railroad while 
engaging in commerce between any of the 
several states . . . shall be liable in 
damages to any person suffering injury while 
he is employed bv such carrier in such 
commerce . . . for such injury . . . resulting 
in whole or in part from the negligence of any 
of the officers, agents, or employees of such 
carrier, or by reason of any defect or 
insufficiency, due to its negligence, in its . 
. track, roadbed, works . . . or other 
equipment. 
Any employee of a carrier, any part of whose 
duties as such employee shall be the 
furtherance of interstate . . . commerce: or 
shall, in any way directly or closely and 
substantially, affect such commerce . 
shall, for the purposes of this Act be 
considered as being employed by such carrier 
in such commerce and shall be considered as 
entitled to the benefits of this Act . . . . 
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IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case. Course of Proceedings 
and Dispositions Below 
This action, brought pursuant to the provisions of the Federal 
Employers' Liability Act and arising from injuries to plaintiff 
Jose Ruiz on May 18, 1990, was filed on March 7, 1991 (R. at 1) . 
Defendant Southern Pacific Transportation Company filed a motion 
for summary judgment on January 22, 1993 on the basis that 
"plaintiff was not within the scope of his employment at the time 
he was injured." (R. at 164). On November 5, 1993, before the 
court ruled on defendant's motion, plaintiff filed a motion for 
partial summary judgment on the scope of employment issue. (R. at 
233) . 
The court issued a ruling on January 11, 1994 which concluded 
that, as a matter of law, plaintiff was not in the course of his 
employment. (R. at 429, see Addendum). The order granting 
defendant's motion for summary judgment and denying plaintiff's 
motion for partial summary judgment was filed on January 22, 1994. 
(R. at 436, see Addendum). 
Plaintiff filed a motion for new trial with supporting 
memorandum on February 7, 1994. (R. at 448). The motion was 
denied by order filed August 8, 1994. (R. at 548). Notice of 
appeal from both the Order Granting Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment and the Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion for New Trial was 
filed on August 31, 1994. (R. at 551). Plaintiff hereby abandons 
his appeal from the order denying the new trial and will proceed 
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only as to the court's order granting summary judgment in favor of 
defendant. 
V. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Jurisdictional Basis 
1. Defendant Southern Pacific Transportation Company is a 
common carrier by railroad employed in interstate commerce. (R. at 
7). 
2. Plaintiff Jose Ruiz was an employee of defendant at the 
time of the accident. (R. at 7, 166, 287). 
3. This is an action for personal injuries by a railroad 
employee pursuant to the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 
U.S.C. section 51 et seq. (R. at 287). 
Employment Status Prior to 5:00 a.m. on May 18, 1990 
4. Plaintiff was a maintenance of way worker assigned to 
Extra Gang 11 working out of Montello, Nevada. (R. at 252-53, 321-
22, 418). 
5. Extra Gang 11 was a trailer gang working between various 
points and could be moved from Ogden, Utah to Sparks, Nevada. (R. 
at 252-53). 
6. Trailer gang members received extra pay for living in 
trailers and moving to different locations. (R. at 255). 
7. The collective bargaining agreement between plaintiff's 
union and defendant governs rates of pay, hours of service and 
working conditions for maintenance of way employees. (R. at 289-90, 
335) . 
8. Employees in trailer gangs are assigned to living quarters 
4 
owned and maintained by defendant, receive a meal expense, are 
provided with bedding and bath supplies or in-lieu payment, receive 
water and ice, may be designated as camp tenders and are expected 
to maintain their quarters in a clean and sanitary condition. (R. 
at 370-72) . 
Designated Assembly Point 
9. Plaintiff's foreman and the foreman's supervisor 
understood the "on-duty point" for Extra Gang 11 to be Montello, 
Nevada. (R. at 304, 381, 414). 
10. Under the collective bargaining agreement, employees' 
time starts and ends at regular designated assembly points. (R. at 
352) . 
11. When an employee's living quarters is a trailer furnished 
by defendant, the trailer is established as the employee's 
headquarters. (R. at 353). 
12. An employee's headquarters is the designated assembly 
point. (R. at 353). 
13. Employees are not allowed time while traveling between 
their homes and designated assembly points. (R. at 367). 
14. Under the collective bargaining agreement, plaintiff was 
entitled to be compensated starting at Montello on the day of his 
accident. (R. at 418-19). 
15. Defendant provided transportation by truck for Extra Gang 
11 members from Montello to its work sites. (R. at 167, 288, 304). 
16. On the day of the accident, when the crew was to fix 
railroad tracks at Lakeside, Utah, pursuant to permission from his 
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foreman, plaintiff was allowed to drive his own vehicle to the work 
site so that he could drive from there directly home to Ogden, Utah 
for the weekend. (R. at 167, 288, 431). 
17. Extra Gang 11 members traveling in defendant's truck from 
Montello to Lakeside on May 18, 1990 were considered to be on-duty 
and were paid overtime from 5:00 a.m. until 7:00 a.m. for the two-
hour commute. (R. at 167, 260, 287, 293, 314). 
18. Plaintiff's foreman told plaintiff that since he would 
not be under defendant's supervision, he would not be compensated 
for his time or reimbursed for the use of his vehicle or gas. (R. 
at 167). 
19. Neither plaintiff's foreman nor the foreman's supervisor 
were aware of any written policy or documents of defendant stating 
that plaintiff would be considered off-duty for the trip from 
Montello to Lakeside in his private vehicle. (R. at 398-99, 412, 
415-16). 
20. Plaintiff's foreman testified by affidavit that plaintiff 
understood he would not be compensated for the commute but that it 
was worth giving up the pay to get home earlier. (R. at 167). 
21. Plaintiff has been adjudicated mentally incompetent, 
functions at the level of a three year old, is not capable of 
participating in a deposition and is unavailable as a witness. (R. 
at 283-84). 
22. Plaintiff's foreman did not have authority under the 
collective bargaining agreement to alter plaintiff's starting time 
for purposes of compensation. (R. at 418) . 
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23. At about 5:00 a.m. on May 18, 1990, plaintiff was dressed 
for work and advised his foreman that he would be right behind the 
truck and that they would meet at Lakeside. (R. at 311-13). 
24. Plaintiff was injured while driving his private vehicle 
from Montello in a rollover accident approximately 14 miles from 
the work site at Lakeside while on a private gravel road owned and 
maintained by defendant which ran parallel to the railroad tracks. 
(R. at 7, 166-68, 287, 395). 
25. Plaintiff's foreman was responsible to report the time 
worked by plaintiff. (R. at 289). 
26. Plaintiff's foreman was of the opinion that plaintiff had 
not yet reported for duty at the time of the accident and did not 
log plaintiff as having performed any work on the day of the 
accident. (R. at 168, 289). 
27. Plaintiff was not compensated for his time on May 18, 
1990. (R. at 168). 
28. The collective bargaining agreement requires that all 
claims or grievances be presented in writing within sixty days from 
the date of the occurrence on which the claim or grievance is 
based. (R. at 374). 
29. Plaintiff suffered a severe injury to his head from the 
automobile accident on May 18, 1990 but did not have a conservator 
appointed until July 8, 1991. (R. at 274, 282) 
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VI. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. Applicability and scope of federal law to plaintiff's 
employment status. 
A. The rights and obligations of the parties in a 
Federal Employers' Liability Act case are controlled by federal 
law. 
B. The term "employed" as used in the Federal Employers' 
Liability Act of 1908 was intended to describe the conventional 
relationship of employer and employee. 
C. By amendment in 1939 Congress expanded the benefits 
of the Federal Employers' Liability Act so as to avoid narrow 
distinctions and to comprehensively expand coverage. 
2. Plaintiff's employment status prior to the accident 
A. Plaintiff Jose Ruiz was covered by the Federal 
Employers' Liability Act before leaving his trailer headquarter on 
the day of the accident. 
B. Because plaintiff's trip from his headquarters to the 
work site was a necessary incident of his employment, he was 
covered by the act during the entirety of his trip prior to the 
accident. 
C. Because plaintiff was on defendant's private road 
leading to the actual work site, he was covered by the act during 
at least that portion of his trip. 
3. The trial court's errors. 
A. Plaintiff's mode of travel did not remove him from 
the act's coverage. 
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B. Neither the willingness of plaintiff to forego pay 
nor the understanding of his supervisor in that regard removed 
plaintiff from the act's coverage and benefits. 
C. The trial court erred in not ruling as a matter of 
law, against defendant's motion for summary judgment. 
D. At the very least, the trial court erred in not 
ruling that there were material triable issues of fact. 
VII. ARGUMENT 
1. Federal law is determinative of the employment status of 
plaintiff at the time of his injury. 
A. Supremacy of federal law 
As enacted in 1908 the Federal Employers' Liability Act 
issue would have been framed as whether plaintiff Jose Ruiz 
suffered injury while he was "employed" by the defendant in 
interstate commerce. See 45 U.S. C. § 51, (paragraph 1, 
Determinative Statute, supra) , Act April 22, 1908, ch. 149, § 1, 35 
Stat. 65. 
The United States Supreme Court has made clear from the 
earliest days of the statute that "there are weighty considerations 
why the controlling law should be uniform and not change at every 
state line." New York Central R.R. Co. v. Winfield, 244, U.S. 147, 
149, 61 L.Ed 1045, 1047-48, 37, S.Ct. 780 (1917). The Court 
restated the point some years later: 
[I]n proceedings under that Act, 
wherever brought, the rights and 
obligations of the parties depend 
upon it and applicable principles of 
common law as interpreted and 
applied in the Federal courts. . . . 
That statute, as interpreted by this 
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Court, is the supreme law to be 
applied by all courts, Federal and 
State. (Chesapeake & Ohio Rv. Co. 
v. Kuhn, 284 U.S. 44, 46-67, 76 
L.Ed. 157, 160, 52 S.Ct. 45 (1931). 
B. The term "employed'1 
In an early interpretation, the Supreme Court expressed 
its "opinion that Congress used the words 'employee' and 'employed7 
in the statute in their natural sense, and intended to describe the 
conventional relation of employer and employee." Robinson v. 
Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 237 U.S. 84, 94, 59 L.Ed 849, 853, 35 
S.Ct. 491 (1915). 
That conventional relationship as it bore upon the 
questions of causal connection to employment was expanded upon by 
the Court a few years later, referring to both English and American 
cases: 
"An accident arises out of the 
employment where it results from a 
risk incidental to the employment, 
as distinguished from a risk common 
to all mankind, although the risk 
incidental to the employment may 
include a risk common to all 
mankind." . . . 
"If it is the normal risk merely 
which causes the accident, the 
answer must be that the accident did 
not arise out of the employment. 
But if the position which the work 
must necessarily occupy in 
connection with his work results in 
excessive exposure to the common 
risk, or if the continuity or 
exceptional amount of exposure 
aggravates the common risk, then it 
is open to conclude that the 
accident did not arise out of the 
common risk, but out of the 
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employment." . . . 
The basis of these decisions is 
that, under the specific facts of 
each case, the employment itself 
involved peculiar and abnormal 
exposure to a common peril, which 
was annexed as a risk incident to 
the employment. (Cudahy Packing Co. 
v. Parramore, 263 U.S. 418, 424-25, 
68 L.Ed. 366, 370, 44 S.Ct. 153 
(1923), citations omitted). 
C. The 1939 amendment 
In 1939 the act was amended "to cure the evils of 
hypertechnical distinctions which had developed in over 30 years of 
FELA litigation which "were replete with very fine distinctions in 
determining whether an employee was engaged in interstate commerce 
within the contemplation of the act so as to entitle him to bring 
suit for damages thereunder for injuries incurred while in the 
carrier's employ•" Southern Pac. Trans. Co. v. Gileo, 351 U.S. 
493, 497, 498, 100 L.Ed. 1357, 1363, 1364, 76 S.Ct. 952 (1956). 
That amendment added the second paragraph as codified at 
45 U.S.C. section 51, so that the "employed/employee" status is now 
clarified to cover "[a]ny employee . . ., any part of whose duties 
. . . shall be the furtherance of interstate . . . commerce; or 
shall, in any way directly or closely and substantially, affect 
such commerce . . . . " See 45 U.S.C. § 51 (paragraph 2, 
Determinative Statute, supra) . Act August 11, 1939, Ch. 685, § 1, 
53 Stat. 1404. In the view of the Supreme Court: 
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Although the amendment may have been 
prompted by a specific desire to 
obviate certain court-made rules 
limiting coverage, the language used 
goes far beyond that narrow 
objective. It evinces a purpose to 
expand coverage substantially as 
well as to avoid narrow distinctions 
in deciding coverage. Under the 
amendment, it is the "duties" of the 
employee that must furnish or affect 
commerce, and it is enough if "any 
part" of those duties has the 
requisite affect. . . . 
"The word ' furtherance' is a 
comprehensive term. Its periphery 
may be vague, but admittedly it is 
both large and elastic." . . . 
Similarly, those duties which "in 
any way directly or closely and 
substantially affect" interstate 
commerce in the railroad industry 
must necessarily be worked out 
through the process of case-by-case 
adjudication. This definition and 
the "furtherance" definition of 
employment in interstate commerce in 
the 1939 amendment are set forth in 
the disjunctive. In some 
situations, they may overlap. (Reed 
v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 351 U.S. 
502, 506, 507, 100 L.Ed. 1366, 1374, 
76 S.Ct 958 (1956). 
The balance of this section of the brief will examine 
that "case-by-case adjudication" and define the "periphery" in 
situations which bear on and control the issue of plaintiff's 
employment status at the time of the accident. 
2. Plaintiff was "employed" under the act prior to and at 
the time of his injury. 
A. Plaintiff was "employed" while in his trailer. 
(1) The Cases 
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In Chicago H., St,P. & P. R.R. Co. v. Kane, 33 F.2d 866 
(9th Cir. 1929) , plaintiff was an extra gang member living in 
company quarters. Prior to the breakfast hour preceding the 
scheduled work day, he was killed while going from the bunk to the 
toilet. The court held that plaintiff was employed in interstate 
commerce and covered by the act. Although "he had not yet lifted 
a pick or stuck a shovel into the ground . . . his employment was 
definite, and the nature and place of his service for the day was 
clearly understood." Id. at 868. Of further significance is the 
prescient comment of the dissent: 
As I understand the majority 
opinion, a railroad employee who 
happens to sleep and take his meals 
in a section house, bunk house, or 
car furnished by the railway company 
on its right of way is continuously 
employed in interstate commerce, 
even during the hours devoted to 
sleep. If this be true, a large 
number of railway employees who make 
their houses, temporarily or 
permanently, in quarters furnished 
by railway companies on their rights 
of way, are continuously employed in 
interstate commerce, even though 
their time of actual employment does 
not exceed eight or ten hours per 
day. (Id. at 870). 
That this was indeed the law was demonstrated some years 
later in an opinion by Judge Learned Hand. In Mostyn v. Delaware 
L. & W. R.R. Co.. 160 F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1947), plaintiff was one of 
a gang of track workers housed and fed in bunk cars. Upon 
returning to his bunk car after a day off and personal errands in 
town, he opted to sleep outside because of the verminous condition 
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of his bunk. He chose a poor place to sleep and lost a foot to a 
passing railroad car. The railroad argued that plaintiff was not 
employed under the act when he went to town and that he did not 
resume employment upon his return. In upholding the jury's verdict 
for plaintiff, Judge Hand replied: 
[A]lthough Mostyn was not "employed" 
on Friday while he was in town, when 
he came back that night to sleep he 
was as much and as little 
"employed," as he would have been 
had he been working during the day. 
It seems to us that when a railroad 
provides shelter or food or both for 
its employees, and they are using 
the accommodations so provided to 
prepare themselves for their work, 
or to rest and recuperate, they must 
be regarded as in its "employ." 
Unless that is true, we are driven 
back to including only the very work 
itself with the addition of going to 
or away from it. . . . [W]e hold 
that, had Mostyn been sleeping in 
one of the "bunk cars," he would 
have been in the "employ" of the 
railroad. (Id. at 17-18). 
In another track employee case, Casso v. Pennsylvania 
R.R. Co., 219 F.2d 303 (3d Cir. 1955), plaintiff was returning to 
his bunk car living quarters after a day off in town. In upholding 
a verdict for plaintiff, against defendant's argument that 
plaintiff was not back in his employment until he returned to the 
bunk car, the court said: 
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We do not think that the 
ascertainment of when a man is under 
the protection of the Act is to be 
determined by any such mechanical 
rule as the defendant contends. 
This is no baseball game in which 
the runner must touch base in order 
to be safe. . . . 
[T]he trial court was right in 
telling the jury that this man, when 
injured, was sufficiently in the 
course of his employment to have the 
benefit of the Act if his case 
otherwise came within it. (Id. at 
306) . 
Among cases cited in support of the proposition, (id. at 
306 n.2), was Atlantic Coastline R.R. v. Meeks, 30 Tenn.App 520, 
208 S.W.2d 355 (1947), in which an employee, after spending a day 
in town, returned to his bunk car and was injured by an exploding 
oil tank. The court held that he was in the scope of his 
employment. 
(2) Factual Application 
Thus in this case in which plaintiff was assigned to 
living quarters owned and maintained by defendant, received 
expenses and supplies from defendant, was subject to designation as 
a camp tender and had responsibilities for his quarters (R. at 370-
72, Statement of the Facts, supra, para. 8), it cannot be doubted 
that plaintiff was "employed" by defendant for purpose of the act 
at and prior to the time when his foreman came to plaintiff7s 
trailer prior to departure for the work site. 
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B. Plaintiff was "employed11 when injured enroute to 
the work site 
(1) The Cases Finding Coverage 
In North Carolina R.R. Co. v. Zacharv, 232 U.S. 248, 58 
L.Ed. 591, 34 S.Ct. 305 (1914), an important subsidiary issue was 
whether the deceased plaintiff, killed on defendant's premises by 
a passing engine, was on a personal errand, rather than on the 
company's business, when he headed toward his off-premises boarding 
house just prior to departing on his run. To the court it was 
"clear that the man was still 'on duty,' and employed in commerce" 
at the time. Id. at 260, 58 L.Ed, at 596. 
The principle was shortly thereafter extended to an 
employee killed on railroad premises by an engine at the close of 
his work day. The Court held: 
In leaving the carrier's yard at the 
close of his day's work, the 
deceased was but discharging a duty 
of his employment. Like his trip 
through the yard to his engine in 
the morning, it was a necessary 
incident of his day's work, and 
partook of the character of that 
work as a whole, for it was no more 
an incident of one part than of 
another. (Erie R.R. Co. v. 
Winfield, 244 U.S. 170, 173, 61 
L.Ed. 1057, 1065, 37 S.Ct. 556 
(1917), citation omitted.) 
The rule was extended again in a case which arose under 
the Utah Workmen's Compensation Act but which has been cited 
repeatedly for its application to the Federal Employers' Liability 
Act. In that case, Cudahy Packing Co. v. Parramore, supra, 
Argument, part IB, plaintiff was killed before reaching his 
employer's premises. In upholding the award to decedent's 
dependents, the Court said: 
Here, the location of the plant 
was at a place so situated so as to 
make the customary and only 
practical way of immediate ingress 
and egress one of hazard. Parramore 
could not, at the point of the 
accident, select his way. He had no 
other choice than to go over the 
railway tracks in order to get to 
his work; and he was in fact invited 
by his employer to do so. . . . 
The employment contemplated his 
entry upon and departure from the 
premises as much as it contemplated 
his working there, and must include 
a reasonable interval of time for 
that purpose. (Id., 263 U.S. at 
426, 68 L.Ed, at 370). 
Similarly, in another case arising out of the Utah act 
which is also repeatedly cited for its persuasive impact on FELA 
cases, Bountiful Brick Co. v. Giles, 276 U.S. 154, 158, 72 L.Ed. 
507, 509, 48 S.Ct. 221 (1928), the Court stated: 
[E]mployment includes not only the 
actual doing of the work, but a 
reasonable margin of time and space 
necessary to be used in passing to 
and from the place where the work is 
to be done. If the employee is 
injured while passing, with the 
express or implied consent of the 
employer, to or from his work by a 
way over the employer's premises, 
. . . the injury is one arising out 
of and in the course of employment 
as much as though it had happened 
while the employee was engaged in 
his work at the place of its 
performance. In other words, the 
employment may begin in point of 
time before the work is entered upon 
and in point of space before the 
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place where the work to be done is 
reached. 
Application of these principles to the Federal Employers' 
Liability Act has thereafter continued in the appellate courts. 
Analysis of those cases makes it clear that in this case, plaintiff 
Jose Ruiz was "employed" while enroute from his trailer to the work 
site. 
In Virginian Ry. Co. v. Early, 130 F.2d 548 (4th Cir. 
1942) , plaintiff's decedent died from complications of an accident 
which occurred on railroad property prior to starting work on his 
return from a private lunchroom about one-fourth of a mile from the 
shops in which he worked. The defendant railroad requested a 
directed verdict or at least a jury submission on the scope of 
employment issue. The trial court rejected both requests and 
decided the issue for plaintiff as a matter of law. In upholding 
that ruling the appellate court reviewed the applicable cases and 
stated that: 
[T]he scope of employment includes 
not only actual services, but also 
those things necessarily incident 
thereto, such as going to and from 
the place of employment on the 
employer's premises. (Id. at 550). 
The same year the issue was raised defensively in Lukon 
v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 131 F.2d 327 (3d Cir. 1942), a case 
arising from the death of a railroad section hand walking along the 
tracks from work toward his home. Despite the fact that there was 
an available alternative route home along public roads, the court 
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was "of the opinion that Lukon was clearly entitled to the 
protection of the act and that the contention of the defendant to 
the contrary cannot be sustained.11 Id. at 329. In support it 
stated an often repeated theme: 
The Federal Employers' Liability Act 
was designed to be applied liberally 
for the protection of railroad and 
other employees. (Id. at 329). 
The thrust of the cases to that point in time was 
summarized in Sassaman v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co. . 144 F.2d 950, 952, 
953 (3d Cir. 1944), as follows: 
[I]t must be made to appear that his 
injuries were sustained either upon 
the premises where he normally 
performed the duties of his 
employment or upon premises so 
closely adjacent thereto as to be a 
part of the working premises in the 
sense that the employee was required 
to traverse them in going to or upon 
leaving his work. In other words, 
the employee's presence upon the 
premises where he receives his 
injuries must have been a necessary 
incident to the discharge of the 
duties of his employment. . . . 
In short, the condition which 
makes possible a claim for injuries 
suffered as in the course of 
employment, but which are actually 
received on premises away from the 
employee's place of employment is 
the fact that the employee must, of 
necessity, traverse such other 
premises in order to reach or depart 
from the place of the discharge of 
his duties. In such circumstances, 
he is upon the adjacent or other 
premises, as a requisite of his 
employment either with the knowledge 
and consent or the approval of his 
employer, at the least, legally 
implied from the knowable situation. 
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The issue reached a federal appellate court again in 
Morris v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 187 F.2d 837 (2nd Cir. 1951), a 
case in which an employee was killed by a railroad car 45 minutes 
before he was to report for work manning a freight-handling 
platform truck. The employee had entered the yard at a forbidden 
but commonly used entrance. All entrances, however, required 
passing over various railroad tracks. Against the railroad's 
"formalistic" argument that decedent was not in the course of his 
employment when he was killed, the court responded: 
It is now too late to argue that a 
worker is within his employment only 
when actually on the job . . . . 
Here, where the decedent was killed 
on the defendant's property only 
shortly before he was to report for 
work, there can be no doubt that he 
was in the course of his employment 
. . . . (Id. at 841). 
In Carter v. Union R.R. Co., 438 F.2d 208 (3d Cir. 
1971), the principle was identified again and applied in favor of 
a railroad employee injured on adjoining non-railroad premises 
enroute from a parking area to his agreed starting point on those 
premises. Although the railroad exercised no control over the path 
where plaintiff was injured, the court noted that his use of the 
property "was within the expectation and intentions of the 
railroad" and held that "he was clearly within the course of his 
employment." Id at 210. 
A state appellate court followed "the rule that the 
Federal Employers7 Liability Act will be liberally construed by the 
courts to effectuate its purpose of benefiting and protecting 
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railroad employees" in Temple v. Southern Pacific Trans. Co., 105 
Cal.App.3d 988, 992, 164 Cal.Rptr. 780, 782 (1980). In that case 
plaintiff was injured in a private vehicle driven by his engineer 
while enroute back to work from a layover point. The court applied 
the overriding federal rule and the scope of employment principle 
developed in the California state courts and held that the trial 
court had erred in concluding that plaintiff was not acting in the 
scope of his employment when injured. 
Finally on point in this series of cases finding for 
plaintiff on the employment status issue is Caillouette v. 
Baltimore & Ohio Chicago Terminal R.R. Co. . 705 F.2d 243 (7th Cir. 
1983) . There plaintiff had entered a switching yard from a 
different than usual entrance, intending to call a switch engine to 
the side where he was supposed to report to work. He was injured 
before calling the engine. The railroad argued that he was still 
in the process of commuting to work and thus outside the scope of 
the Federal Employers' Liability Act. In concluding that the case 
came within FELA coverage, the court analyzed the commuter cases as 
follows: 
Commuters are excluded from coverage 
for two reasons — they are not 
required to commute on their 
employer's trains, and, while 
commuting, they are in no greater 
danger than any other member of the 
commuting public. Employees 
traversing the work site are covered 
because this is a necessary incident 
of the days work. (Id. at 246, 
citations omitted). 
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(2) The cases denying coverage 
The principle that divide coverage from noncoverage is 
best demonstrated by comparing the foregoing cases to those which 
have denied coverage. The following cases, spread from 1934 to 
1981, show when and why FELA coverage is excluded. 
In Young v. New York N.H. & H. R.R. Co., 74 F.2d 251 (2d 
Cir. 1934), the plaintiff locomotive fireman was injured going to 
his home in New Haven after completing his work. With his engineer 
he had walked a mile on a public road, taken a public bus, and 
"dead-headed" on one of defendant's trains before finally riding on 
one of defendant's locomotives past the New Haven station to Cedar 
Hill in order to pick up his street clothes. His election to ride 
the locomotive to obtain his clothes from the Cedar Hill station 
was his own choice instead of the alternative of continuing with 
the engineer and taking a trolley home. In ordering a new trial 
after a verdict for plaintiff, Judge Learned Hand said that 
plaintiff's desire to obtain his street clothes "was natural 
enough, but it had nothing to do with his employment, and could 
scarcely concern his relations with the defendant; he must arrange 
for it on his own responsibility." Id. at 253. 
On retrial and further appeal from a judgment for 
plaintiff, the court again reversed, noting that plaintiff "had 
signed off at 6:45 p.m. and the accident happened at 9:00 p.m. His 
duty to appellant had ended." Young v. New York N.H. & N. R. R. 
Co. . 79 F.2d 844, 845 (2d Cir. 1945). "Since the ride to Cedar 
Hill had no relation to interstate transportation, either past, 
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present, or future, the appellee fails to bring himself within the 
prescribed provisions of the Federal Employers' Liability Act . . 
• ." Id. at 846. In Sassaman v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co. , supraf the 
plaintiff train dispatcher, "after having discharged, for the day, 
the duties of his employment" (id., 144 F.2d at 951), was injured 
when alighting from one of defendant's passenger trains onto a 
platform which was in a bad state of repair. On appeal plaintiff 
argued that "he was still upon the defendant's premises consequent 
upon and incident to his taking leave of his place of employment to 
return home . . . ." Id. at 952. 
The court disagreed. Because after employment "he was 
free to travel home or go elsewhere, as suited his desires, by 
whatever means of transportation he chose [and] was not required to 
travel on the defendant's train. . .[or] upon a particular train[,] 
[t]here was absent . . . the employer compulsion as to the mode of 
travel to and from work which serves to attach or continue the 
employee relationship away from the place of employment, and makes 
an interstate employee's right of recovery for injury remediable 
under the Federal Employers' Liability Act." Id. at 953. 
In Quirk v. New York C. & St. L. R.R. Co., 189 F.2d 97 
(7th Cir. 1951), plaintiff's decedent was a general foreman who, 
after his gang had quit work for the day, left work at Muncie 
without notifying his supervisor and was bound for home. He drove 
a fellow employee's private automobile to Tipton and then used one 
of defendant's motor cars. He died in a collision with another 
motor car. 
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The court affirmed dismissal of the action holding that 
"decedent's employment relationship ceased at the time he departed 
from Muncie in a privately owned automobile. . . . When he left 
Muncie, he was engaged solely in a personal activity unrelated to 
his duties as an employee of the defendant." Id. at 100. As for 
the trip from Tipton toward home: "It was only a continuation of 
the same engagement, without any alteration of motive or purpose." 
Id. at 101. 
In Atchison. T. & S.F. R. R. Co. v. Wottle, 193 F.2d 628 
(10th Cir. 1952), plaintiff's decedent, a section hand, and his 
bunk mate left their bunk house by automobile an hour after 
quitting time in order to obtain food and bedding, neither of which 
was provided by the railroad. Before reaching their destination 
twelve miles away, both were killed by a train. 
Noting that it was decedent's sole responsibility to 
obtain the food and bedding, the court's majority concluded that: 
"When, therefore, after his day's work, he set out in his own car 
to obtain groceries for himself, he was on a mission wholly 
unconnected and unrelated to his employment, and his injury while 
thus engaged cannot be said to be in commerce within the meaning of 
the Act." Id. at 631. 
In Metropolitan Coal Co. v. Johnson. 265 F.2d 173 (5th 
Cir. 1959), plaintiff, a freight train flagman, boarded one of 
defendant's passenger trains to go from his home in Rhode Island to 
join his freight train crew in Boston. Plaintiff was injured 
enroute as a result of a children's prank which shattered a window. 
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In ruling against FELA coverage, the court noted that plaintiff was 
not required to go to work on defendant's passenger train and could 
have taken other routes, trains or means of transportation. Id. at 
178. 
Beyond that "plaintiff's employment as a flagman on a 
freight train did not subject him to any peculiar or abnormal 
danger while he was riding to work on one of his employer's 
passenger trains. On that train, he was exposed to no other or 
greater hazard than any other passenger." Id. at 178. The court 
refused "to extend the coverage of the Act to an employee who is 
miles away from his job and only proceeding to it in a public 
conveyance . . . ." * Id. at 178. 
Finally, in this series of cases denying coverage, there 
is Fowler v. Seaboard Coastline R.R. Co., 638 F.2d 17 (5th Cir. 
1981). There plaintiff, a railroad clerk, during work hours on an 
enforced paid lunch break and on his employer's property, was 
killed after being thrown from a motorcycle recently purchased by 
another employee. Decedent's duties did not require him to use a 
motorcycle and the vehicle bore no relation to decedent's job as a 
clerk. Both the trial and appellate court found as a mater of law 
"that the motorcycle excursion was a purely private activity 
totally unrelated to the employment and denied recovery" under 45 
U.S. C. section 51. Id. at 20. 
(3) Factual application of the legal principles 
This review of the cases has demonstrated that because 
plaintiff's activity, while enroute to his work site was totally 
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related to his employment, he was "employed" under the Federal 
Employers' Liability Act. See Statement of the Facts, supra, 
paragraphs 15, 16, 17, 23, and 24. 
Plaintiff was not "on a personal errand" but was rather 
"on the company's business" when he headed toward the work site. 
See North Carolina R.R. Co. v. Zachary, supra. 
He "was but discharging a duty of his employment"; "it 
was a necessary incident of his day's work; and it partook of the 
character of that work as a whole . . . ." See Erie R.R. Co. v. 
Winfield, supra. 
The location of the work site "was at a place so situated 
so as to make the customary and only practical way of immediate 
ingress and egress one of hazard"; plaintiff "could not, at the 
point of the accident, select his way"; "[h]e had no other choice 
than to go over the railwayfs private gravel road] in order to get 
to his work"; and "he was in fact invited by his employer to do 
so." See Cudahy Packing Co. v. Parramore, supra. 
Plaintiff was "injured" while passing, with the express 
or implied consent of the employer, to or from his work by a way 
over the employer's premises." Bountiful Brick Co. v. Giles, 
supra. 
"[T]he scope of employment includes not only actual 
services, but also those things necessarily incident thereto, such 
as going to and from the place of employment on the employer's 
premises." Virginian Ry. Co. v. Early, supra. 
"The Federal Employers' Liability Act was designed to be 
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applied liberally for the protection of railroad and other 
employees." Lukon v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., supra. 
Plaintiff's injuries were sustained "upon premises so 
closely adjacent [to the premises where he normally performed the 
duties of his employment] as to be a part of the working premises 
in the sense that [he] was required to traverse them in going to 
. . . his work." See Sassaman v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., supra. 
Plaintiff was injured "on the defendant's property only 
shortly before he was to report for work . . . ." Morris v. 
Pennsylvania R.R. Co.. supra. 
Plaintiff's use of the road "was within the expectations 
and intentions of the railroad . . . ." Carter v. Union R.R. Co.. 
supra. 
"Employees traversing the work site are covered because 
this is a necessary incident to the day's work." Caillouette v. 
Baltimore & Ohio Chicago Terminal R.R. Co.. supra. 
On the other hand, the cases denying FELA coverage, 
clearly are inapposite. 
Plaintiff's trip "had nothing to do with his employment"; 
"it had no relation to interstate commerce." See Young v. New York 
N.H. & H. R.R. Co., supra., 74 F.2d at 253, 79 F.2d at 846. 
Plaintiff "was free to travel home or go elsewhere, as 
suited his desires . . . ." Sassaman v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 
supra. 
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Plaintiff "was engaged solely in a personal activity 
unrelated to his duties as an employee of the defendant." Quirk v. 
New York C. & St. L. R.R. Co.. supra. 
Plaintiff "was on a mission wholly unconnected and 
unrelated to his employment . . . ." Atchison. T. & S. F. R.R. Co. 
v. Wottle. supra. 
"Plaintiff's employment . . .did not subject him to any 
peculiar or abnormal danger while he was riding to work . . . ." 
Metropolitan Coal Co. v. Johnson, supra. 
Plaintiff's "excursion was a purely private activity 
totally unrelated to the employment . . . ." Fowler v. Seaboard 
Coastline R.R. Co.. supra. 
Thus the travel of plaintiff Jose Ruiz from his trailer 
headquarters, where he was clearly covered under the Federal 
Employers' Liability Act, enroute to the work site was also a 
covered activity. It most certainly was a covered activity once he 
reached defendant's private gravel road which provided access to 
the actual work site. 
The next question is whether anything else even arguably 
removes that coverage. It is that question to which we now turn. 
3. The trial court erred in granting summary judgment to 
defendant. 
A. The court's ruling 
The trial court's primary basis for granting summary 
judgment to defendant was the court's conclusion that plaintiff had 
changed his "on-duty" location from Montello to Lakeside. (R. at 
432, see Addendum, Ruling at 4). That conclusion was based on the 
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court's finding relating to the permission given to plaintiff to 
drive his own vehicle to Lakeside. (R. at 430-31, See Addendum, 
Ruling at 2-3, findings 4-6). Because the court viewed the 
agreement between plaintiff and his foreman as one which was made 
"for personal reasons and having no causal relationship with his 
employment" and because plaintiff would not be "under the control 
and supervision of the defendant" while driving, the court 
concluded that plaintiff "was commuting from Montello to Lakeside 
. . . ." (R. at 432-33, see Addendum, Ruling at 4-5). 
The court recognized that the use of plaintiff's own 
vehicle was "not controlling" but "pivotal" was the agreement that 
plaintiff would "be on his own time" until he arrived at Lakeside. 
Also persuasive to the court were the "other circumstances of not 
being compensated and reimbursed expenses for the travel" and "of 
using his personal vehicle for the trip . . . ." Thus the court 
was persuaded that plaintiff "was not in the course of his 
employment but pursuing personal objectives." (R. at 433, see 
Addendum, Ruling at 5). 
Although the court recognized that "it may be said that 
plaintiff's driving of his car to Lakeside was done in the 
furtherance of defendant's business . . .it did so no more than any 
commute . . . ." The court's view was that plaintiff had not 
"reported to work" in Montello; "he needed to be available for work 
and under the supervision and control of the employer." (R. at 
434, see Addendum, Ruling at 6). 
B. The court failed to utilize FELA principles 
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Most striking in the court's ruling is its total failure 
to focus on the principles of the FELA cases defining the words 
"employed" as used in the statute. As a result, the court failed 
to recognize the following: 
(1) Plaintiff was "employed" under the statute even 
while in his trailer before leaving on the drive to Lakeside. 
(2) Plaintiff remained "employed" while on the 
drive to Lakeside. 
(3) Plaintiff was most certainly "employed" when 
driving on defendant's private gravel road enroute to the actual 
place of work at Lakeside. 
(4) There is no FELA authority for removing 
"employed" status pending "reporting for duty" or the report "to 
work" of an employee living in a railroad work camp. 
(5) There is no FELA authority for removing 
"employed" status because an employee uses his personal vehicle 
enroute from a work camp to a work site. 
(6) There is no FELA authority for removing 
"employed" status because an employee is willing to waive pay or 
expenses• 
(7) There is no FELA authority for removing 
"employed" status because an employee is not under the direct 
control or supervision of his employee. 
As a result of these failures, the court's conclusion 
that plaintiff "was not in the course of his employment as a matter 
of law" cannot stand. 
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C. The court failed to recognize triable factual issues. 
Although it is the view of plaintiff that, as a matter of 
law he was "employed" at the time of his injury, it must be pointed 
out that even under the trial court's view of material facts, there 
were material factual issues in dispute. Those issues concern 
plaintiff's "on-duty" point, the validity of any agreement to 
change that point and plaintiff's entitlement to pay. 
In its findings and ruling, the court determined that 
plaintiff's request to drive his own vehicle to the work site 
constituted a request to report to work at Lakeside, Utah and, 
therefore, change his "on-duty" location from its usual location at 
Montello, Nevada. That purported change in "on-duty" location, by 
the court's analysis, converted the trip to the work site into a 
"commute" during which plaintiff was "not in the course of his 
employment." 
In making these finding and ruling, the court ignored the 
following evidence: 
(1) Under the collective bargaining agreement, 
employees' time starts at regular designated assembly points. (R. 
at 352, 418). 
(2) When an employee's living quarter is a trailer 
furnished by the railroad, the trailer is established as the 
employee's headquarters and designated assembly point. (R. at 353, 
418) . 
(3) Plaintiff's foreman did not have authority to 
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alter plaintiff's starting time. (R. at 418). 
(4) Plaintiff "assembled" at his headquarter point 
at Montello, Nevada. (R. at 418-19). 
The court also found persuasive the fact that plaintiff 
was not compensated by defendant for his travel time after leaving 
the work camp enroute to the work site. However, the preceding 
evidence, also established that plaintiff was entitled to be 
compensated for that time. In addition, there was other competent 
evidence, relating to the pay issue, which was presented by the 
general chairman of plaintiff's union, that under the collective 
bargaining agreement, plaintiff was entitled to be compensated 
starting at Montello on the day of his accident. (R. at 417-19). 
Thus, even if the FELA were ignored, as the trial court 
did, and everything turned on plaintiff's "agreement" and on the 
issue of pay, the trial court ignored evidence relating to the 
validity and effect of the "agreement" as it related to both the 
designated assembly point and plaintiff's entitlement to pay for 
his time going to the work site. 
On this analysis alone the court erred in concluding as 
a matter of law that plaintiff was not in the scope of his 
employment. 
D. An agreement to waive FELA coverage is void 
Finally, the purported "agreement" between plaintiff and his 
foreman, as construed by the court would be void under provisions 
of 45 U.S.C. section 55. The reason the "agreement" is void is 
because it fits within the statutory prohibition contained within 
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the Federal Employers' Liability Act at 45 U.S.C. section 55, which 
in relevant part provides that: 
Any contract, rule, regulation, or 
device whatsoever, the purpose or 
intent of which shall be to enable 
any common carrier to exempt itself 
from any liability created by this 
act, shall to that extent be void . 
• • • 
Section 55 has been interpreted to invalidate any company 
rule, policy or individually bargained for agreement which in any 
way limits or attempts to limit the carrier's liability under the 
FELA. See, e.g. , Thompson v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co,, 15 F.2d 28 
(8th Cir. 1926) (employee's agreement upon hiring). In this 
instance the "agreement" between plaintiff and his supervisor was 
done to limit plaintiff's on-duty status and therefore, to limit 
FELA liability as to an employee transporting himself between the 
work camp and the work site. Thus the "agreement" is void under 
Section 55. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff has demonstrated that as a matter of law he was 
"employed" and entitled to the benefits of the Federal Employers' 
Liability Act at the time of his injury. 
He has also demonstrated that even on the court's non-FELA 
analysis, material triable issues of fact existed. 
On either alternative, the trial court erred in concluding 
that defendant was entitled to summary judgment. 
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Plaintiff respectfully requests t/liis Court to reverse the 
trial court and remand this matter for/iurthii/ proceedings. 
Dated: April 10, 1995 
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Tab A 
§ 51. Liability of common carriers by railroad, in interstate or 
foreign commerce, for injuries to employees from negligence; defini-
tion of employees 
Every common carrier by railroad while engaging in commerce between 
any of the several States or Territories, or between any of the States and 
Territories, or between the District of Columbia and any of the States or 
Territories, or between the District of Columbia or any of the States or 
Territories and any foreign nation or nations, shall be liable in damages to 
any person suffering injury while he is employed by such carrier in such 
commerce, or, in case of the death of such employee, to his or her personal 
representative, for the benefit of the surviving widow or husband and 
children of such employee; and, if none, then of such employee's parents; 
and, if none, then of the next of kin dependent upon such employee, for 
such injury or death resulting in whole or in part from the negligence of 
any of the officers, agents, or employees of such carrier, or by reason of 
any defect or insufficiency, due to its negligence, in its cars, engines, 
appliances, machinery, track, roadbed, works, boats, wharves, or other 
equipment. 
Any employee of a carrier, any part of whose duties as such employee shall 
be the furtherance of interstate or foreign commerce; or shall, in any way 
directly or closely and substantially, affect such commerce as above set 
forth shall, for the purposes of this Act be considered as being employed 
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by such carrier in such commerce and shall be considered as entitled to the 
benefit of this Act and of an Act entitled "An Act relating to the liability 
of common carriers by railroad to their employees in certain cases 
Approved April 22, 1908) [45 USCS §§ 51 et seq.] as the same has been or 
may hereafter be amended. 
(Apr. 22, 1908, ch 149, § 1, 35 Stat. 65; Aug. 11, 1939, ch 685, § 1, 53 
Stat. 1404.) 
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) Case No. 910900648 
Both parties move for partial summary judgment on the issue of whether 
plaintiff, a railroad employee, was within the scope of his employment when he was 
injured. These motions are made in the context of the Federal Employers1 Liability Act. 
The court grants defendant's motion for partial summary judgment. In doing 
so, it finds the following facts, viewed most favorably to the plaintiff: 
Findings 
1. The plaintiff suffered serious injuries on May 18, 1990, as a result of a 
one-car accident. His injuries left him mentally incompetent, and this court has appointed 
a guardian and conservator for him. 
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2. At the time of his accident, he was an employee of defendant, Southern 
Pacific Transportation Company. He was also a permanent resident of Ogden, Utah, but 
he temporarily resided at a workcamp in Montello, Nevada, to facilitate his dispatch to 
worksites directed by the defendant. 
3. Montello had been plaintiffs ordinary "on-duty" location since January 
1990. As such, defendant paid him from the time he reported to work there each day, and 
it also provided transportation for him and other employees to various worksites. 
4. Prior to the accident, plaintiff sought permission to report to work at a 
worksite in Lakeside, Utah, instead of at Montello, on Friday, May 18. He made this 
request because he wanted to go home to Ogden the night before, and the drive back for 
him was closer to the worksite than to Montello. 
5. His foreman, Andrew Gonzales, granted his request, subject to the 
agreement, discussed on several occasions prior to May 18, that because he would not be 
in company transportation and under company supervision, he would start and end his 
work at Lakeside. Accordingly, he would be on his own time and would not be 
compensated for his travel time to Lakeside, for which he was normally paid overtime, 
and, further, he would not be reimbursed for operating his private vehicle. He agreed 
because his proposed arrangement would also allow him to leave directly from Lakeside 
to Ogden and thus get home three hours sooner for the weekend. Gonzales made this 
agreement based on his understanding of company policy. 
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6. Plaintiff subsequently changed his mind about going to Ogden on 
Thursday night, probably because his crew worked late that day, and he stayed in 
Montello. His decision to drive his personal vehicle to Lakeside the next morning and 
to leave directly from Lakeside to Ogden did not change, however. About 5:00 a.m. the 
morning of the accident, Gonzales knocked on plaintiffs trailer door to inquire if he 
would becoming with the rest of the work crew who were in the gang truck; he declined. 
Instead, the plaintiff, who was dressed for work but still fixing his lunch and not 
assembling for work with the other crew members, said he would drive his own car and 
join them in Lakeside, where the crew would fix railroad tracks. 
7. Enroute from Montello to Lakeside, plaintiff rolled his vehicle on a road 
owned by the defendant. Defendant paid plaintiff no wage compensation or travel 
expense for May 18, 1990. 
Issues 
In opposing defendant's motion, plaintiff presents two issues for 
determination. First, are Gonzales1 declarations concerning plaintiffs statements regarding 
his personal travel arrangements and his status at the time of the accident objectionable 
hearsay under Rules 803 and 804, Utah Rules of Evidence? Second, was plaintiffs on-
duty location in Lakeside or Montello on May 18, 1993? 
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A nalysis 
Based on the facts presented, the court concludes and rules as follows: 
Admissions Are Not Hearsay 
By his legal position, plaintiff maintains that he was within the scope of his 
employment at the time of his accident. His statements made to Gonzales prior to and 
on May 18 controvert that position. Plaintiff seeks to exclude those statements under 
Rules 803 and 804 on the basis that they are hearsay made inadmissible because plaintiff, 
who is mentally incompetent, is unavailable as a witness at trial. 
Plaintiffs status is more than a witness; he is a party. Consequently, the 
subject statements, which are his own statements and are offered against him, are party-
admissions not hearsay. See Rule 801(d)(2), Utah Rules of Evidence. These statements 
are, therefore, admissible. Furthermore, Rule 804, which is inapplicable in this case, is 
an exception to the hearsay rule to allow, not exclude, the admission of hearsay statements 
against interest if the declarant is "unavailable." It is a rule of necessity, having a 
predicate of unavailability, to avoid the loss of critical evidence. 
Plaintiff Changed His On-Dutv Location from Montello to Lakeside 
Instead of reporting for duty at Montello with the other employees on the 
morning of May 18, plaintiff remained in his trailer fixing his lunch. Under his prior 
agreement with his foreman, Gonzales, he changed his on-duty location to Lakeside for 
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personal reasons and having no causal relationship with his employment. By changing 
his on-duty location and substituting company transportation for personal transportation, 
he, unequivocally, was not under the control and supervision of the defendant when he 
left Montello for Lakeside. In point, his employer could not supervise his conduct if he 
chose to exceed the speed limit or to drive without a seat belt, and thus minimize its 
exposure to liability. Unlike the other crew members who were in the gang truck and 
under the direction of their foreman and, thus, were ready to perform work as directed, 
plaintiff was subject to that direction only after he arrived in Lakeside. In short, he was 
commuting from Montello to Lakeside in his own vehicle. 
The mere use of his own vehicle is not controlling in the court's 
determination. Plainly, the law allows an employee to drive his own vehicle with 
permission of the employer and still be in the course of his employment. Pivotal in the 
court's ruling is the agreement between plaintiff and Gonzales to change plaintiffs on-duty 
location to Lakeside and to be on his own time until he arrived there, thus making the 
ride from Montello to Lakeside a commute. The other circumstances of not being 
compensated and reimbursed expenses for the travel between Montello and Lakeside and 
of using his personal vehicle for the trip only further persuade the court that he was not 
in the course of his employment but pursuing personal objectives. 
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While it may be said that plaintiffs driving of his car to Lakeside was done 
in the furtherance of the mission of defendant's business, because he was needed on the 
job, and thus that act benefitted the business, it did so no more than any commute by an 
employee to a business so that he can perform his duties. Likewise, plaintiffs mere 
presence in the workcamp in Montello, away from his permanent residence in Ogden, did 
not establish that he had reported to work; he needed to be available for work and under 
the supervision and control of the employer. 
The court concludes, therefore, that there is no issue as to any material fact 
and that defendant was not in the course of his employment as a matter of law. 
Defendant's counsel shall prepare, please, an appropriate order for the court's signature. 
Dated this II day of January 1994. 
MICHAEL D. LYON, Judg4 
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TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, and 
JOHN DOES I - X, inclusive, 
Defendants. 
STATE OF UTAH 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 910900648 
Honorable Michael D. Lyon 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and 
plaintiff s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment came before 
this Court for hearing on Thursday, December 9, 1993 at 11: 15 
a. m. The Honorable Michael D. Lyon presided. Plaintiff was 
represented by Donald Britt and Erik Ward. Defendants were 
represented by Bryon J. Benevento. Based upon Defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment, Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment, Affidavit of Andrew Stephen Gonzales, Plaintiff s 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Plaintiff s Memorandum in 
Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, 
Plaintiff s Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment, Defendants' Reply to Plaintiff s Memorandum in 
Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment; and 
Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff s Motion for 
Summary Judgment, Plaintiff s Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities in Reply to Defendants' Motion to Plaintiff s 
Motion for Summary Judgment, Declaration of Robert Douglas, 
Defendants' Motion to Strike Affidavit of Robert Douglas, 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendants' 
Motion to Strike Affidavit of Robert Douglas, and oral argument 
of counsel and for other good cause appearing thereon; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the 
facts presented by the parties, viewed most favorably to the 
plaintiff, demonstrate that as a matter of law plaintiff was 
not within the scope of his employment at the time he was 
injured. Therefore, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is 
granted, and Plaintiff s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is 
denied. The case is hereby dismissed. 
DATED this 3S] day of _ ^fcf\^ , 1994. 
BY THE COURT 
Michael D. Lyon ' 
Second Judicial District Court Judge 
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